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1  Introduction 
Employment protection legislation has been a focus of policy concern in the European 
Union. There is now considerable evidence that this type of labour market rigidity is 
associated with higher unemployment.
1 More recently attention has focused on the 
impact of labour regulations on the incentives for firms to invest in productivity 
enhancing innovation and growth. Here the relationship is less clear. When making its 
innovation decision a firm considers two effects of employment protection legislation 
(EPL). First, EPL introduces a firing cost to any adjustment to employment made by 
the firm. Second, this adjustment cost increases job security for existing workers as it 
reduces the probability of being fired in response to small fluctuations in demand. 
Efficiency wage arguments suggest that this increases the value of employment for 
the worker and increases their (unobservable) effort, which in turn can increase the 
return to innovation for the firm.
2 On the other hand, where innovation is radically 
new and requires new skills, and thus a drastic adjustment to employment, EPL may 
increase the cost of such innovation. Existing models of radical innovation suggest 
that countries with low EPL have a comparative advantage in radical innovation.
 3    
The main contribution of this paper is empirical. To motivate our empirical strategy 
we describe a model that incorporates both positive and negative effects of EPL on 
innovation incentives for firms. We distinguish between incremental innovation and 
radical innovation: radical innovation is potentially more profitable than incremental 
innovation, but requires a large and drastic employment adjustment, because workers 
with new skills are needed to implement the innovation (as in Chapter 8 of Aghion-
Howitt 1998). EPL increases this cost of adjustment, but it also has positive effects on 
both types of innovation by increasing workers’ effort to further increase the 
                                                 
1 See, inter alia, Lazear (1990), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005), 
and Griffith, Harrison and Macartney (2007). 
2 See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for the efficiency wage set-up and Boeri and Jimeno (2005) for an 
application to EPL. Although not its central point, workers invest more in general training in the 
presence of search frictions in the labour market when they are less likely to be fired by their present 
employer in Acemoglu (1997). See also Akerloff (1982), Agell (1999) and Chapter 10 of Saint-Paul 
(1996) for the positive effects of EPL.  
3 See Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) and Samaniego (2006). Also Cunat and Melitz (2007) provide theoretical 
and empirical evidence that countries with flexible labour markets have a comparative advantage in 
industries with high demand volatility. Caballero et al. (2004) provide theoretical and empirical 
evidence that countries with strong EPL are slow to adjust employment, and that this is associated with 
low productivity growth. Also, Bartelsman et al. (2008).      3
productivity of innovations. The model suggest that, for plausible parameter values, 
the optimal level of investment in radical innovation decreases with EPL but that the 
optimal level of investment in incremental innovation increases with EPL. 
The paper is related to several literatures. It is directly related to the growing literature 
on the effects of labour market regulations on productivity and by extension to the 
papers on cross-country patterns of specialization and national institutions.
4 There is a 
related literature on the product life-cycle that distinguishes between new product 
innovation and mature product innovation, where demand is more certain for the 
latter.
5 It also relates to the endogenous growth literature and the model presented 
builds heavily on the framework of Aghion-Howitt, where the distinction between 
radical and incremental innovation is through the employment adjustment that is 
required to implement radical innovation.
6 Our paper is also related to the literature on 
the location of activity by multinational firms.
 7 
There is an existing empirical literature on the relationship between labour regulations 
and productivity and innovation, based mainly on cross-country evidence, which 
remains inconclusive, with studies finding divergent results.
8 Such studies struggle to 
deal with two key identification problems. One is that the effect of EPL may depend 
on the nature of innovation, and in most data it is difficult to distinguish between 
incremental and radical innovation. The other is that in the cross-section labour 
                                                 
4 See, inter alia, Nunn (2007), Carlin (2003). 
5 See, inter alia, Klepper (1996) and Breschi et al. (2000), Audretsch (1995), Puga and Trefler (2005), 
and Saint-Paul (1997, 2002). 
6 This is in contrast to the distinction that radical innovation is less likely to succeed than incremental 
innovation that is made in Saint-Paul (1997, 2002) and Bartelsman et al. (2008). We argue that 
modelling radical innovation as requiring adjustment to employment is appropriate for our sample of 
large incumbent firms, whereas modelling radical innovation as more risky with high firing costs 
arising in the event of failure seemed more appropriate for small firms and considerations of firm entry 
and exit. If radical innovation were more risky and the cost of failure (exit) increased with EPL then 
this would enhance our predictions. 
7 See, inter alia, Dunning (1977), Caves(1996), Ekholm and Hakkala (2007), Devereux and Griffith 
(1998). Haaland and Wooton (2003) show that multi-national enterprises will locate high risk projects 
in countries with low redundancy costs in the presence of industry or economy wide wage bargaining, 
and when the risk profile of the MNE is different to that of domestic firms.  
8 Both Storm and Nastepaad (2007) and Buchele and Christiansen (1999) find that high EPL is 
associated with greater productivity growth. Bassanini and Ernst (2002) find that EPL has a negative 
effect in less coordinated countries, in higher coordinated countries workers and firms can align their 
interests better. Similarly, Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) find a significant impact of EPL on multi-factor 
productivity growth when interacted with bargaining coordination, but no linear result. Hall and 
Soskice (2001) argue that differences in specialisation between Germany and the US are due to the 
more market orientated financial and labour market institutions in the US. Acharya et al. (2009) find 
that strong labor laws encourage innovation. Akkermans et al. (2005) support the view that liberal 
market economies specialize in radical innovation.     4
regulations may be correlated with unobservable characteristics of countries, 
industries and firms that determine innovation. We deal with the first challenge by 
using an intuitively appealing measure of radical innovation: the proportion of 
citations on a patent application made to scientific journals (as opposed to other 
patents). We show that patents that are closer to the scientific literature are associated 
with more variability in output and employment. We tackle the second challenge by 
basing our results on an identification strategy that uses variation within multinational 
firms from 12 countries on where they locate different innovative activities, and 
therefore controls for unobservable characteristics of the home country, industry and 
firm that affect the innovation decision. We find that multinational firms perform 
more overall innovation in high EPL countries, but that the same multinational firms 
perform more radical innovation in low EPL countries.  
We see these basic relationships in the cross-country association between EPL and 
innovation activity. Figure 1 shows the average proportion of citations to the scientific 
literature plotted against EPL, using data on all firms that applied for patents at the 
European Patent Office.
9 The downward sloping relationship suggests that there is 
less radical innovation performed in countries with high EPL. In this paper we focus 
on multinational firms.
10 Figure 2 shows the same negative association between EPL 
and radical innovation across these firms. In Figure 3, however, we see a positive 
effect of EPL on overall innovation. These aggregate pictures may be masking many 
different effects. We show below that these results are robust to controlling for firm 
fixed effects and for many country level regulatory and factor endowment 
characteristics.  
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a simple model of incremental and 
radical innovation; section 3 discusses our identification strategy; section 4 describes 
our empirical specification and data, explaining our measure of radical innovation; 
section 5 presents our results; and a final section concludes. 
                                                 
9 This graph is based on patent applications made to the European Patent Office by 37,350 listed and 
unlisted firms in the private sector, see Macartney (2009). These firms were responsible for the filing of 
230,322 patents in the period 1997 to 2003.  The country is the country of registration of the applicant 
firm. 
10 This is a sample of 1,378 subsidiaries of multinational firms, see Section 4 for details of the data 
used.     5
2  Theoretical Background 
The current literature on the effect of EPL on productivity suggests that the nature of 
innovation has a role to play. The endogenous growth literature (Aghion-Howitt, 
1998) emphasize the difference between radical and incremental innovation. Where 
successful, radical innovation requires a drastic adjustment of employment as the 
human capital of existing workers is rendered obsolete. EPL increases this cost by 
way of firing costs. Radical innovation is more valuable than incremental innovation 
and more costly. If there is uncertainty in future demand then EPL also has a positive 
effect on the returns to both types of innovation, in that it increases worker 
commitment and their efforts in making the new technology more productive through 
learning by doing. EPL will increase incremental innovation effort, but at sufficiently 
high levels it will decrease radical innovation effort. Thus firms will be more likely to 
choose to perform radical innovation in low EPL regimes and incremental innovation 
in high EPL regimes, which is the central prediction tested in this paper. 
The underpinnings of this model are based on Aghion-Howitt (1998). Innovation 
improves the productivity of intermediate goods supplied by a firm for use in the 
production of a final good. A further improvement on this productivity gain comes via 
the effort (or learning by doing) of production workers. This effort is higher in the 
presence of employment protection legislation (EPL), which takes the form of higher 
firing costs per worker, as production workers are less likely to be fired and therefore 
more likely to share in the surplus from increased productivity.  
However, EPL can also have negative effects on innovation, depending on whether 
innovation is radical or incremental. Radical innovation is more productive, but makes 
existing human capital obsolete. The implementation of a radical innovation requires     6
that all production workers are replaced, at a per worker firing cost. Incremental 
innovation increases productivity, but to a lesser extent than radical innovation, and 
existing production workers are retained. EPL’s effect on worker effort will have an 
increasing effect on the returns to both types of innovation, but due to the firing costs 
it will also have a negative effect on the returns to radical innovation.  
In this paper our main interest is in the impact of EPL on innovation incentives, where 
the main impact of EPL is on costs, and therefore to focus on this effect we assume 
away any strategic impact of innovation in the product market.  
2.1  Model 
A final good is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods produced by firms, 
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where y is final output, i indexes firms (and intermediate industries, since each firm is 
a monopolist in its industry), j= 0, I, R indexes innovation type,  ( )
j
i e Z  is the level of 
investment in unobservable effort made by production workers, 
j
i A  is the 
intermediate producers productivity level, and x is other inputs to production. 
Profits of the intermediate firm are given by,  
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where 
j
i π is profits and δ  reflects the extent of competition in the intermediate goods 
market. 
We consider the following timing of events:      7
Intermediate producers draw an initial productivity level 
0
i A . Firms decide whether to 
invest in radical or incremental innovation, and how much to invest (which 




i µ µ , ). If successful, incremental innovation 
leads to a productivity increase of  1 > γ  and, if radical innovation is successful 
productivity increases by a factor of 
2 γ . Innovation incurs a fixed cost.  
Productivity is enhanced by the efforts of workers. However, in the case of radical 
innovation existing workers do not have the required skills to work with the new 
technology and must be fired and replaced by more skilled workers.
11 Production 
workers decide the level of investment in unobservable effort 
j
i e , which increases 
productivity by a factor  ( )
j
i e Z . A demand shock occurs which leads to the possibility 
of the worker being fired. We assume that the future uncertainty in demand is small 
enough to be trivial to the firm, although of importance to the workers. 
Intermediate production occurs, if the firm chooses incremental innovation then they 
use existing workers. If the firm chooses radical innovation then existing production 
workers are fired at cost ϕ  per worker. They are replaced at zero hiring costs by 
production workers with more appropriate skills. Output is sold and the surplus shared 
between the firm and its workers, depending in part on (exogenous) worker 
                                                 
11  This implies that innovation and production are co-located, so the effect EPL has on worker 
incentives affects the firm’s innovation incentives. Such a co-location is more likely when technology 
transfer costs are high relative to product transport costs (see Ekholm and Hakkala 2007). This is 
consistent with a model where location is endogenous and determined by the effect EPL has on the 
benefits to innovation. That is, if transport costs are low so that production can be located anywhere, 
firms may choose to locate innovation and production in countries where the labour market 
environment is conducive to their intended type of innovation.  
     8
bargaining power β . We are interested in the innovation incentives for the 
intermediate producers. 
To solve for the impact of firing costs on firms' incentives to innovate we solve the 
problem by backward induction:  
Output generates surplus for the firm. These are given for each j technology by, 
()
0 0 1 i i V π β − =         ( 3 )  
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where 
j
i V   is firm i’s surplus using technology j, 
j
i µ  is the level of innovation effort 
by the firm, 
j
i c  is variable costs of innovation for j technology,  i f  is firing cost 
incurred if radical innovation is successful, and 
j F  is fixed costs of innovation for j 
technology. 
Variable costs take the form, 








i A c µ = .          ( 6 )  
Intermediate production occurs. Output of the intermediate firm is given by equation 
(2). 
If the firm has chosen not to innovate or chosen incremental innovation then it uses 
existing workers. If the firm chose radical innovation then existing production 
workers do not have the skills to work with the new technology and are fired by the 
firm. EPL is modeled as a firing cost of ϕ  per worker (a bureaucratic cost, not a     9
transfer to the worker), that makes employment adjustment costly.
12 These firing costs 
take the form, 
   ( )
0 0
i i i A e kZ f ϕ =         ( 7 )  
where  ( )
0 0
i i A e kZ  is the number of existing workers employed by the firm.
13 New 
workers are hired at zero hiring costs.  
Demand shock occurs. There are shocks to demand which mean that the worker will 
be fired with probability  () ϕ s . This occurs after the worker has committed to an effort 
level. We assume that the future uncertainty in demand is small enough to be trivial to 
the firm, although of importance to the workers (see Acemoglu 1997, and Boeri and 
Jimeno 2005). The firing cost of ϕ  per worker makes it more likely that employment 
adjustment in the face of demand shocks is unprofitable to the firm and, therefore, 
() () 0 , < ′ = ϕ ϕ s s s . In this way EPL increases workers’ job security, and therefore 
increases their effort.  
                                                 
12 There are conditions where EPL will be irrelevant to firm location, specifically when EPL takes the 
form of a redundancy payment rather than a bureaucratic cost to the firm. Pissarides (2001) and Lazear 
(1990) show that redundancy costs are irrelevant to the firm location decision if wages are determined 
endogenously. The worker takes into account both the probability of firm bankruptcy and the size of 
the redundancy payment when bargaining over wages. We have assumed this situation away by 
interpreting EPL as regulation that results only in a (bureaucratic) firing cost to the firm and not a 
transfer to the worker. However, EPL as redundancy will affect location decisions if wage bargaining is 
conducted at the industry level rather than at the firm level and the probability of bankruptcy is private 
information to the firm and is different to the industry average (Haaland and Wooton 2003). The 
worker, taking into account the probability of receiving a redundancy payment, accepts a low (high) 
wage if the industry average riskiness is high (low). Therefore a firm that is more risky than the 
average is worse off, as it still has to pay the same wage as other firms but has a higher probability of 
paying a redundancy payment. Therefore risky firms (or firms more likely to make employment 














k . The number of existing workers comes from simple profit maximisation.     10
Production workers decide level of effort. This increases productivity by a factor 
( )
j




i e Z e Z Z ). Workers will choose effort to 
maximise their expected return, 
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i e e Z , so that Z displays diminishing returns 
to workers effort and is equal to one if workers make zero effort. Using this, 
substituting equation (2) into (8) and performing the maximization we obtain an 
expression for the worker’s optimal effort, 
* j
i e : 
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= .     (9) 
Worker effort for target innovation type j is increasing in the productivity of that 
innovation, and increasing in EPL,  



















,                                              (10) 
since  () 0 < ′ ϕ s , i.e. the probability of being fired decreases with EPL.  
Firm decides level of innovation. The problem facing the firm is to choose the optimal 
level of innovation effort, conditional on the type of innovation and on worker effort. 
For incremental innovation the firm chooses innovation effort, 
I
i µ , such that (from 
substitution of equation (2) into equation (4)): 
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i e Z e Z γ =  the firm’s optimal 
innovation effort will be:
14 
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This effort is increasing in EPL, since learning-by-doing is increasing in firing costs, 
as stated in equation (10), and  1 > γ .  
To investigate how radical innovation varies with firing costs we substitute equations 
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δγ β µ .     (14) 
Innovation incentives are increasing in workers learning-by-doing effort and therefore 
EPL has an increasing effect for both types of innovation. Due to the large 
employment adjustment required in the case of radical innovation, firing costs also 
have a decreasing effect on the incentives for  radical innovation.  
                                                 
14 Maximisation of equation (11) gives ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1
* 0 0 * 0 0 2 * 0 = − − −
I
i i i i i i A A e Z A e Z µ γ δ γ δ β , which 
after rearrangement results in equation (12).  
15 Maximisation of equation (13) gives 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1
* 0 2 0 * 0 0 * 0 0 4 * 0 = − − − −
R
i i i i i i i A A e kZ A e Z A e Z µ γ ϕ δ γ δ β  , which after rearrangement 
gives equation (14).       12
2.2  Robustness to assumptions 
The idea that EPL increases worker effort in making innovation more productive is 
robust to changing a number of the assumptions of the model. For instance, we have 
assumed that the workers’ return to learning-by-doing effort is entirely tied to the 
firm, i.e. their efforts enhance the productivity of the firm’s capital but do not enhance 
their own productivity. However, say the worker gained from their efforts by way of 
acquiring general skills. Becker (1964) predicts an under-investment in general skills, 
as workers are credit constrained and firms are reluctant to fund skills that the worker 
may use elsewhere. As described by Acemoglu (1997) it is likely that a contract could 
be written to mitigate such a problem (penalties for workers who train and quit) and, 
for our purposes, it is not initially clear what role EPL has to play: EPL will not stop 
workers leaving once trained and offered a job elsewhere. Acemoglu (1997) considers 
a model of training and innovation with job market search frictions, where workers 
can exogenously lose their job with probability s.
16 Costly job search means that when 
a worker and firm are matched they bargain over the surplus of the match, and 
therefore over any increased productivity that the worker has achieved through 
learning-by-doing effort. This leads to an under-investment in training by workers, as 
there is a probability of being fired and then, after search, receiving only a part return 
to their training efforts. Where EPL reduces this probability of being fired, it will 
mitigate this problem of under-investment, which would be qualitatively consistent 
with our model. 
We have also assumed that the worker’s effort is unobservable, otherwise the firm and 
worker could write a contract specifying e in return for a guaranteed wage in each 
                                                 
16 Our equation (9) is inspired by equation (2) in Acemoglu (1997).     13
period. We could relax this assumption and assume that such a contract can be written 
and that there is a monitoring technology available to the firm so that a worker can be 
caught shirking with some probability. The efficiency wage paid to the worker so that 
they do not shirk is increasing in the exogenous probability of spontaneous dismissal 
in the future (“economic dismissal”), increasing in the exogenous probability of once 
dismissed getting another job (“flow into employment”) and decreasing in the 
probability of getting caught shirking and subsequently being dismissed (“disciplinary 
dismissal”), as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). EPL can then have two effects: it will 
decrease the probability of economic dismissal, but it will also decrease the 
probability of disciplinary dismissal. Boeri and Jimeno (2005), argue that for large 
firms (which is what we consider in our empirical application), where monitoring is 
very difficult, the dominant effect of EPL is that it decreases the probability of 
economic dismissal and therefore increases the value of employment to the worker 
and reduces the efficiency wage that the firm must pay. As in our model, EPL will 
increase the firm’s innovative effort, since the lower efficiency wage will increase the 
return to the firm from innovation. 
2.3  Relevant ranges for firing costs to affect innovation effort 
Specifying a functional form for  ( ) ϕ s  allows us to infer how optimal innovation 
effort varies over reasonable ranges of firing costs. Specifically, consider the case 
where there is a probability p of a drop in demand from 
h θ  to 































p s .                                                      (15)     14
This function is decreasing in ϕ  at an increasing rate:  ( )( ) 0 , 0 < ′ ′ < ′ ϕ ϕ s s . Using a 
linear approximation for equation (15) (see Appendix A.1) and, along with equation 
(9), we note that the expression for radical innovation effort, equation (14), is 
quadratic in firing costs. Furthermore, radical innovation effort initially increases with 
ϕ  and then decreases with ϕ . This functional form for  ( ) ϕ s  is not necessary for the 
qualitative predictions of our model, but it will help in discussing the dominant effect 
of EPL on radical innovation effort for realistic values of ϕ .  
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Equation (16) is strictly positive: higher EPL, modeled as higher firing costs, 
unambiguously increases optimal incremental innovation effort. In equation (17) the 
first term is positive for  1 > γ , and the second two terms are negative and increasingly 
so in ϕ . To find the point at which firing costs start to have a negative effect on 
radical innovation, 
R ϕ ˆ , set equation (17) equal to zero and solve to obtain:
17                             
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kpb
R α δ γ β ϕ − + − − − − = 1 1 1 1
1 ˆ 2











becomes equation (18) after some rearrangement.     15
Therefore, 
R ϕ ˆ  is lower when the productivity gains from innovation are low (when γ
is smaller), and when the firms gets a low proportion of the return to innovation 
(worker bargaining power, β , is high). Also, 
R ϕ ˆ  is lower when the extent to which 
ϕ  increases learning-by-doing is lower: that is, when the probability of a negative 
demand shock, p, is low and therefore the relevance of EPL in making workers feel 
secure in their jobs is lower; and when the elasticity of final good output with respect 
to intermediate good input is low (i.e.  ( ) α − − 1  is small) as this reduces the 
intermediate good adjustment required in the face of a small demand shock and 
therefore the possibility of getting fired and the relevance of EPL to job security (see 
Appendix A.1).
  
We can show that for reasonable values of the parameters in our model we always 
expect to be in the range where EPL has a negative impact on incentives for radical 
innovation, that is 
R ϕ ˆ  is less than the lower limit of the likely range of ϕ . The firing 
cost ϕ , which is a bureaucratic cost of dismissing a worker, is likely to be no greater 
than the worker’s reservation wage which is normalized at one. Therefore, it is 
realistic to assume that ϕ  is between zero and one. Setting 
2 / 1 , 1 . 0 , 2 , 2 / 1 = = = = β α p b  we can calculate that  0 ˆ <
R ϕ  for  821 . 1 ≤ γ  and that 
for  968 . 1 821 . 1 ≤ < γ ,  1 ˆ 0 < <
R ϕ .
18 In this second range of γ  values, EPL increases 
the value of radical innovation initially, but will start to decrease it again as the radical 
firing cost effect starts to outweigh the learning-by-doing effect. Remembering that in 
                                                 






























4 .     16
this model the productivity gain from an incremental innovation is γ  and that for a 
radical innovation is 
2 γ , the values just mentioned are very large:  821 . 1 = γ  
corresponds to a productivity gain from incremental innovation of 82.1 percent and 
from radical innovation of 231.6 percent. Therefore, in this model it is likely that 
0 ˆ <
R ϕ   and, therefore, firing costs have a strictly decreasing effect on radical 
innovation incentives. Also, the model predicts that firing costs have a strictly 
increasing effect on incremental innovation.  
2.4  Empirical predictions 
The theoretical discussion suggests two empirical predictions that we can take to the 
data: 
Prediction 1: Firm innovation activity is higher in regimes with higher EPL. 
Prediction 2: The proportion of innovation performed by firms that is “radical” (and 
will likely require significant adjustments in employment) is higher in regimes with 
low EPL.   
3  Empirical strategy 
In order to investigate the two empirical predictions outlined above we consider the 
decisions of multinational firms over where to locate innovative activities across 
twelve OECD countries. As emphasised above, our identification strategy is to use 
variation within multinational firms, which allows us to control for a large range of 
potentially unobservable characteristics at the firm, industry and home country level. 
We use data on multinationals from 12 countries. We consider both the total level of 
innovative activity, and the level of activity on the most technologically new projects, 
which we interpret as being those most associated with employment adjustment and 
volatility (we show evidence to support this interpretation).     17
Our main measure of the level of innovative activity is a count of patents. We follow 
the literature (Hausman et al (1984), Pakes (1986), Blundell et al (1999)) and model 
the count of patents with a linear exponential model.  
Consider a multinational firm (m), with a number of subsidiaries (s) each of which 
operates in (a potentially different) industry (i) and is located in country (c). We 
model the level of inventive activity, measured by patent applications (P), in each 
location as a function of EPL, a range of other covariates (X), multinational effects (η
) and an idiosyncratic error (u): 
  ( ). exp 1 ms m ci c ms u X EPL P + + + = η β                (19) 
 
Our interest is in the sign and magnitude of  1 β . Recall from the discussion above that 
the theoretical literature is ambiguous about what we expect the sign to be - a positive 
sign would suggest that the dominant effect of EPL is to increase both firms 
investment in workers and worker commitment, while a negative sign would support 
the idea that higher EPL makes employment adjustments more costly. 
While the theoretical literature is ambiguous about the impact of EPL on the overall 
level of innovative activity, it clearly points to a detrimental effect of EPL on more 
technologically advanced or risky investments. To empirically investigate this 
prediction we estimate 
( ) ms m ci ms c ms X CITWP EPL NPL ν η γ β + + + + = ln exp 2      (20) 
where NPL is a weighted count of patents that gives a greater weight to patents that 
are more technologically advanced. More specifically, NPL is a count of patents 
weighted by the number of citations made to non-patent literature, mainly scientific 
journals (the specific definition is discussed further in the next section). CITWP is the 
count of all patents weighted by all citations made, to control for differences across 
patents in the amount of citations made. Again, our interest is the sign and magnitude 
of  2 β  - a negative sign would indicate that higher technologically advanced patenting, 
as a proportion of overall patenting, is associated with lower EPL.     18
One concern we might have with estimating equations (19) and (20) is that EPL is 
correlated with other institutional variables that also affect innovation incentives. We 
control for country level measures of other labour market regulations, a measure of 
product market regulation, concentration in the banking sector and a measure of the 
efficiency of the courts, all of which may affect the value of holding a patent.
19 Full 
definitions of all variable and sources are in Table A1. 
Some of these variables are highly correlated with EPL, as we can see from the 
correlation matrix in Table 1, and it is therefore challenging to separately identify the 
effect of EPL, as with all studies using cross-country variation in this way. EPL is 
particularly highly correlated with collective bargaining coverage and bargaining 
coordination, which have been found to be determinants of worker bargaining 
power,
20 and with the OECD overall measure of product market conditions. 
Nevertheless, our results are robust to controlling for these institutional variables. 
A further concern we might have is that differences in country-industry specialization 
may influence our results. The trade literature emphasises that countries with a large 
endowment of capital or skills have an advantage in industries that are capital or skill 
intensive, which may include high-tech industries. We follow Nunn (2007) and use 
capital abundance and investment in skills at the country level, interacted with 
estimates of industry capital and skill intensity. Another concern is that country size 
may be correlated with EPL, and production activity locates in large countries to 
access the product market, and where this production is highly skilled it drives up 
                                                 
19 See Aghion et al. (2005) for the effect of product market regulations that determine competition on 
innovation. See Carlin (2003) for the effect of banking concentration on specialisation in high tech 
innovative sectors. 
20 See Calmfors and Driffil (1988), Flanagan (1999) and Griffith, Harrison and Macartney (2007) for 
further discussion and evidence that coordination increases worker bargaining power.     19
wages for high skilled workers in those countries (e.g. see Ekholm and Hakkala, 
2007). As market access is less important for R&D this may crowd out highly skilled 
innovation to smaller countries. To control for country size we include population.  
These considerations lead to the following structure for  ci X : 
    c c c i i c c i i ci Pop H H h h K K k k X 6 5 4 3 2 1 α α α α α α + + + + + + = ,                  (21) 
where  i k  is the capital per unit output in industry i based on US data (the US is not in 
the sample),  c K  is the natural log of the capital per worker in country c,  i h  is the skill 
intensity of industry i,  c H  is the natural log of the proportion of GDP spent on higher 
education in country c, and  c Pop  is the working population of country c averaged 
over the sample period. 
4  Data 
In order to estimate equations (19) and (20) we need information on the geographic 
location and level of technological sophistication of multinational firms’ innovative 
activity, along with information on EPL and other country and industry 
characteristics. 
4.1  Measuring the  innovative activity of multinational firms 
The data on patents come from the European Patent Office PATSTAT dataset, which 
we have matched to information on corporate ownership structure and financial 
accounts from BVD Amadeus (see Macartney 2009). Patent applications filed at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) are an attractive measure of innovative activity for a 
number of reasons. The advantage of this measure is that it is administrative in nature 
with well defined rules that are independent of the location of the patent applicant. 
Furthermore, it is measured at the firm-location level (in contrast to data on firm level     20
R&D expenditure, which is not widely available for firms in many European 
countries, and where it is reported it is almost always at the world-wide level). Patents 
data has been widely used and found to be closely related to R&D expenditure 
measures (see Griliches et al. 1984 and 1990), and this is also true for our data at the 
industry level (see Macartney 2009). There are of course also drawbacks to using 
patents as a measure of innovative activity, including that firms in different industries 
and countries have different propensities to patent, and that the value of a patent is 
heterogenous across firms. Our identification strategy, of looking within the firm, 
helps to control for many of these potential drawbacks. 
Our main sample contains 1,378 subsidiaries of 343 multinational firms.
21 These 
subsidiaries file at least one patent that makes at least one citation. Conditioning on 
only patents that make a citation is convenient for estimating the functional form of 
equation (20), which includes as a regressor the log of the total number of citations 
made by patent held by a subsidiary. In the results section we show that the results we 
find for equation (19) are similar for the larger sample that also includes subsidiaries 
that file patents that make no citations.   
Table 2 shows how the firms and patent applications are distributed across countries. 
Column (1) shows the total number of firms (including domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries) in each country, and column (2) shows the total number of patents filed 
by corporations. Column (3) shows how the 1,378 subsidiaries of multinational firms 
that make up our baseline sample are distributed across countries and column (4) 
gives the count of their patent applications. The baseline sample includes all patent 
                                                 
21 Voith AG was removed form the sample due to concerns about the data.       21
applications whether or not they have been granted (we show the results are robust to 
considering only granted patents).  
To estimate equation (19) we measure innovative activity as a simple count of patents 
(P). We use simple counts rather than weighting patents by citations received as many 
of the patents are relatively new and therefore citations are severely truncated. 
However, our results are robust to using citations weighted patents, suggesting that 
the effect is significant for economically valuable patents. To estimate equation (20) 
we measure radical innovation activity ( ms NPL ) as a count of non-patent literature 
(NPL) citations made by patents filed by subsidiary s in multinational firm m over the 
sample time period, and we control for the total number of citations made by the same 
patents. This measure is an indicator of the newness of the innovation, since NPL 
citations are typically citations to scientific journals. Table 3 shows how the 
proportion of all citations made that are to NPL varies across industries. We can see 
that industries which we might expect to require highly scientific innovation, such as 
food production, transport and communications, finance and chemical (including 
pharmaceuticals) have the highest proportion of NPL citations, and industries which 
we might expect to involve less scientific innovations, such as light manufactures, 
have the lowest proportion of NPL citations. 
Our interest in this paper is on the effect of labour market regulations that affect job 
security for workers and adjustment costs for employees. Increased job security 
increases worker incentives to invest in innovation and therefore increases the return 
to innovation for employers. However, where innovation is uncertain or significantly 
new, in that it requires an adjustment in the skill mix of employees which may involve 
the replacement of existing workers with external workers, regulations that protect 
existing employment increase the cost of innovation. Our expectation is that the     22
second effect will dominate the first when innovation is significantly technologically 
advance, as measured by the proportion of citations to the scientific literature (NPL). 
In Table 4 we show a number of correlations that supports the appropriateness of this 
measure. We start in column (1) by showing the positive correlation between high 
NPL citations and the average number of inventors per patent, a possible indicator of 
the complex nature of the technology. Column (2) shows that NPL innovation is 
positively correlated with employment adjustment within firms and column (3) that 
NPL innovation is correlated with country-industry sales volatility, a measure of 
uncertainty. 
4.2  Employment Protection Legislation 
We use an index of EPL from the OECD (OECD Economic Outlook 1999 Chapter 2) 
and widely used in the literature on the determinants of unemployment (see, inter alia, 
Nickell et al. 2005, Nicoletti et al 2000). Our preferred measure is the indicator of the 
legislation relating to regular contracts (covering procedural inconveniences, direct 
cost of dismissal, notice and trial period). Our results are also robust to using the 
higher level indicator that also includes legislation for temporary contracts (covering 
types of work admissible under temporary contracts and maximum cumulative 
duration allowed). Key for our purposes is that there is real variation in this measure 
across the countries in our sample, as is evident from Figure 1.  
5  Results 
To recap, we have derived empirical predictions of an effect of EPL on innovation 
that is differential across the nature of innovation. On the one hand EPL may increase 
overall patenting, but on the other hand it may reduce radical innovation. We consider     23
whether there is empirical support for these predictions, controlling for multinational 
firm fixed effects, country and industry characteristics.  
5.1  Main results 
The results for total innovation are presented in Table 5. Column (1) shows results for 
a simple specification with multinational firm fixed effects. The positive coefficient 
on EPL indicates that, within multinational firms, more innovation is performed by 
subsidiaries in countries with high employment protection for workers. To ensure that 
the result is not driven by patterns of industrial specialization in countries with 
abundant capital, column (2) includes as control variables the capital intensity of the 
industry in which each subsidiary resides, the capital abundance of the country in 
which it is registered and the interaction between these two variables. The coefficient 
on the interaction of capital abundance and capital intensity is positive as we would 
expect, and the coefficient on EPL remains positive and statistically significant. Also 
included is the working population of each country to ensure that the result that total 
patenting occurs more in countries with high EPL is not driven by market size effects 
that may be correlated with employment regulation. To ensure that our results are not 
driven by patterns of industrial specialization in countries with abundant skills, 
column (3) includes as control variables the skill intensity of each industry in which 
subsidiaries resides, the skill level of the country in which it is registered and the 
interaction between these two variables. Although the coefficient on this interaction is 
negative, counter to intuition, column (3) shows that our results are not driven by 
patterns of comparative advantage with relation to skills.
22  Column (4) ensure that our 
result is not driven by other national regulations, by including a set of product market, 
                                                 
22 We do not have data on higher education expenditure in Portugal so two observations drop out.     24
financial market and legal variables, as well as other labour market regulations. 
However, as shown in column (1) of Table 1, many of these variables are highly 
correlated with our measure of EPL. This, and the fact that the coefficient in column 
(4) increase substantially in magnitude relative to the previous three columns and 
slightly loses statistical significance, suggests problems of multi-colinearity in this 
specification.  
Table 6 show the results for radical innovation. The dependent variable is the number 
of citations to the non-patent literature, with the log of the total number of citations as 
a control, so that we can interpret the results as the effect of EPL on the proportion of 
citations that are to NPL. In column (1) the negative coefficient on EPL indicates that, 
within multinational firms, the more technologically advanced innovation is 
performed by subsidiaries in countries with low employment protection for workers. 
Column (2) presents the results with controls included for industry capital intensity, 
national capital abundance and their interaction. The coefficient on the interaction of 
capital abundance and capital intensity is positive, as we would expect. The 
coefficient on EPL remains negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Again, the working population of each country is included as a control for market size 
effects. Column (3) includes control variables for industry skill intensity, country skill 
abundance and their interaction. The coefficient on this interaction is positive as 
expected, but is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the coefficient on EPL in 
column (3) remains negative and statistically significant. Column (4) ensures that our 
key result is robust to the inclusion of regulatory variables in product, financial and 
labour markets, as well as the efficiency of legal institutions. The coefficient on EPL 
remains negative and statistically significant at the 10% level.      25
5.2  Robustness  
The specification so far only used data on subsidiaries that file patents that make 
citations. However, we can use a larger sample that also includes subsidiaries that file 
patents that make no citations, as well as those that file patents that do make citations, 
to look at the impact of EPL on total innovative activity. The coefficients (standard 
errors) for this sample of 2,870 subsidiaries for the equivalent specifications shown in 
Table 5 are shown in Table 7. The results remain robust. 
Weighting patents by the number of citation that they receive captures their economic 
importance. The sample of patents that we have used in this paper have been filed 
relatively recently, and therefore citations are truncated. Nevertheless, we re-run the 
regressions from column (1) in Table 5, weighting the patent count by citations so far 
received. The resulting coefficient (standard error) on the EPL variable is 0.2257 
(0.1294). Also, the regression was re-run using the total number of citations made as 
the dependant variables, in which case the coefficient (standard error) on the EPL 
variable is 0.3224 (0.1233).   
The results thus far have relied on patent filings irrespective of whether or not those 
patents have been granted. The motivation for using all patent filings is again the 
relative youth of the patents in the sample. Patents may not have been granted yet, 
although they will be in the future. Furthermore, the length of time it takes for a patent 
to be granted may be related to the nature of that innovation, i.e. how radical the 
innovation is, and therefore conditioning on only granted patents may introduce non-
classical measurement error into the dependant variable. Nevertheless, our results are 
broadly robust to conditioning on only patents that have been granted. This reduces 
the sample to just 820 observations. The coefficient (standard error) for the 
specification previously presented in column (1) of Table 5 when we use only granted     26
patents is 0.3027 (0.1419) and the coefficient (standard error) for the specification 
previously presented in column (1) of Table 6 when we use only granted patents is -
0.173 (0.0286). It is not possible to identify the effect of EPL on innovation and 
include skills, capital and other regulatory variables on this reduced sample. 
We use a measure of employment protection that concerns only regular full time 
contract. We can also use a measure that includes the protection afforded to temporary 
workers as well as regular workers, and includes a measure of protection against 
collective dismissals. The results that employment protection increase incremental 
innovation by firms and decreases radical innovation is robust to using this higher 
level measure of employment protection as shown in columns (1) and columns (4) of 
Table 8. Columns (2) and columns (5) show the two specifications using the 
employment protection legislation afforded to temporary workers as the variable of 
interest and columns (3) and (6) shows the results with both EPL for regular contracts 
and EPL for temporary contracts included as separate variables. The fact that the 
coefficient on EPL for regular contracts is in general the larger and more statistically 
significant suggests that it is the rights of permanent employees that affect firms 
incentives with regard to innovation, as we would expect given the intuition of the 
model presented in this paper.      
5.3  Economic Significance 
What is the economic significance of these estimates? To consider this we look at the 
impact of moving each country to the mean EPL index of 2.3. Consider countries such 
as Italy and Germany, which have relatively strong employment protection legislation 
with an EPL index of 2.8. Reducing their EPL to the mean in our sample of 2.3 would 
result in approximately a 20% fall in overall patents (using the coefficient estimates in     27
column (2) of Table 5 evaluated at the mean level of patenting), but an increase in 
radical innovations of around 5%.  
On the other hand, consider a country like Denmark with a low amount of 
employment protection, which has an EPL index of 1.6. Increasing their EPL index to 
2.3 would lead to an increase in overall patenting of around 37%, but a fall in radical 
innovations of around 6%. These are substantial effects.  
6  Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the relationship between employment protection 
legislation and innovation activity across twelve European countries. We use new data 
on the activities of multinational firms operating across different jurisdictions. Our 
findings suggest that multinational firms do more incremental patenting activity in 
high EPL countries and more radical patenting activity in low EPL countries. This is 
consistent with a variant of an Aghion-Howitt style growth model that incorporates 
the two effects of EPL - increases job security for existing workers, and thus increased 
effort, and increased firing costs leading to higher adjustment costs for the firm.  
As a final caveat, however, we should note that our empirical findings are also 
consistent with other theoretical models, such as Saint-Paul’s model of comparative 
advantage, and with the ideas put forward in Hall and Soskice. We are not able to 
empirically distinguish these alternative models. Care must be taken in interpreting 
these results. While we have attempted to control for a number of other characteristics 
that vary across countries, and for firm specific characteristics, identification is still 
from cross-sectional data. We do not observe sufficient time series variation in EPL 
and our data to identify the effects of changes in labour market regimes. Nonetheless,     28
this evidence is suggestive and appears to be robust to a number of standard concerns 
put forward in the literature.     29
Appendix A.1 
In a similar vein to Boeri and Jimeno (2005) consider that there is a small probability 
p that demand for the final good will drop from high, 
h θ , to low, 
l θ .
23 For a given 
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On the realisation of the demand shock the firm will wish to adjust employment from 
h
i x to the new optimal level 
l
i x  by firing workers. The probability of being fired for 















p s . .                                                           (A1) 
In the presence of EPL it costs the firm ϕ  per worker to adjust employment 
downwards. The loss to the firm of a non-optimal level of employment, xi, is given 
by: 
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α θ α θ π ,                         (A2) 
where the first term is the level of profits given low demand but with employment 
l
i i x x >  and the second term is the level of profits given low demand and the optimal 
level of employment. When 
l
i i x x = ,  0 = ∆ i π . The firm faces firing costs given by 
( ) i
h
i x x − ϕ . The firm will adjust the employment level until the marginal gain from 
                                                 
23 This is simpler than Boeri and Jimeno (2005) in that we consider that demand is normally high, but 
there is a small possibility that it drops. The firm initially chooses employment levels assuming demand 
will be high. 
24 For simplicity the j superscript and the variable for workers effort, 
j
i e , are omitted from the 
discussion in this section.      30
doing so equals the marginal cost of firing an employee. The optimal level of 
employment,  i x ˆ , given firing costs is then given by: 
  ( ) ϕ α θ
α α − = −
− − 1 ˆ
1 1 2
i i
l x ZA                                                     (A3) 
Therefore, 
















.                                                        (A4) 
This expression is increasing in ϕ . Note that it reduces to 
l
i x  in the absence of firing 
costs ( 0 = ϕ ). There will also exist some level of ϕ  where no adjustment occurs. 
Substituting this into A1 gives the probability of being fired faced by each worker in 
























































































p s .             (A5) 
This probability decreases as 
h l θ θ →  as we would expect.
25 Writing out  () ϕ s  































p s ,                                        (A6) 
                                                 
25 The probability of being fired is non-positive when 
h l θ θ = . Note that  1 < α .     31



















































p s .                                  (A8) 
As  1 < α  and restricting  [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ ϕ  we have   ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 < ′ ′ < ′ ϕ ϕ s s , that is the probability 
of a worker losing their job is decreasing in ϕ  and at an increasing rate.
26 
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Appendix A.2 
From differentiation of equations (12) and (14) in the main text, incremental 
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.                   (A11) 
                                                 
26 Restricting firing costs to be between zero and one is natural here as the workers reservation wage is 
normalised to one and it is likely that firing costs will be some proportion of that. s tends to negative 
infinity as firing costs tend to one, but we just exclude this and say that at some point firing costs are so 
high that the firm does not adjust employment at all.     32
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l h b  we 
can write:
27 
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) ( i i i A pb b p p A b b p e Z βδ ϕ α βδ ϕ α + − + − = − − − − = .   (A13) 
Insertion of expression (A13) into (A10) and (A11), after trivial manipulation results 
in equations (16) and (17) in the main text. 
                                                 
27 Note that b is decreasing in the severity of the shock. Its range is between zero and 
α − 1
1
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Figure 1: EPL and Radical Innovation (all firms) 
 
Notes: The graphs shows the relationship between radical innovation and EPL for the 37,350 private sector firms 
registered in the countries presented that filed patents in the period 1997 to 2003. These firms were responsible gor 
the filing of 230,322 patents in this period. The x-axis shows the average index for Employment Protection 
Legislation (Regular Contracts from OECD (XXXX) over the period 1997-2003. The y-axis shows the average 
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Figure 2: EPL and Radical Innovation by Multinational Firms 
 
Notes: Based on a sample of 1,378 subsidiaries of multinational firms, see Section 4 for details of the data used 
Fitted line weighted by number of subsidiaries. The confidence interval uses standard errors clustered at the 
country level.  
Figure 3: EPL and Innovation by Multinational Firms 
 
Notes: Based on a sample of 1,378 subsidiaries of multinational firms, see Section 4 for details of the data used 
Fitted line weighted by number of subsidiaries. The confidence interval uses standard errors clustered at the 
country level. 
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Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation and Control Variables 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
Employment Protection Legislation 
(Regular Contracts) 
(1)  1 . 0 0             
Union Density - Average 1997-2003 
 
(2)  - 0 . 2 2   1 . 0 0            
Collective Bargaining Coverage 
 
(3)  0.63  0.05  1.00          
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-
2003 
(4)  0.33  0.24  0.87  1.00         
Bargaining Coordination 
 
(5)  0.73  0.09  0.59  0.39  1.00        
OECD Product Market Regulations 
1998&2003 Average 
(6)  0.57  -0.36 0.63 0.53 0.36 1.00           
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 
1997-2002 
(7)  0.19  0.52 0.36 0.17 0.52 -0.14 1.00         
Percent of Claim Spent in Court and 
Attorney Fees (where mandatory) 
(8)  0.10  0.07 -0.20 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.40 1.00       
Log of Real Capital per thousand workers, 
2000 USD, 1995 prices, in year 1997 
(9)  0.42  0.27 0.65 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.36 -0.47 1.00     
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education 
(10) 0.16  0.47 0.28 0.26 0.17 -0.45 0.43 0.16 0.06 1.00   
Average working population (mil.) 1997-
2003 
(11) 0.09  -0.74 -0.07 -0.06 -0.18 0.25 -0.43 0.01 -0.40 -0.41 1.00 
Notes: see table A1 for full descriptions and sources. 
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Table 2: Firms and Patents 
Country Number  of   
firms 





Number of patents filed 
by subsidiaries of 
multinational firms 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Belgium 853  4,583 36  622 
Germany 11,592  108,431  491  12,998 
Denmark 1,151  4,160  40  380 
Spain 1,149  2,084  34  181 
Finland 869  8,032 5  72 
France 4,043  31,310  322  10,536 
United Kingdom  7,964  23,857  228  2,766 
Italy 4,556  11,833  89  1,027 
Netherlands 2,103  21,442  64  1,765 
Norway 689  1,362 5  54 
Portugal 54  96  2  25 
Sweden 2,327  13,132 62  2,131 
Total 37,350  230,322  1,378 32,557 
Notes: Column (1) includes subsidiaries of domestic and multinational firms.  
 
 
Table 3: Industries and Non-Patent Literature Citations 
INDUSTRY  
Percent of Citations to Non-Patent 
Literature 
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO  0.26 
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION  0.22 
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE AND BUSI  0.19 
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS  0.17 
BASIC METALS  0.15 
ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT  0.14 
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY  0.13 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; RESTAURANTS  0.11 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUC  0.10 
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILE  0.10 
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT  0.10 
CONSTRUCTION 0.09 
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS  0.09 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, NEC  0.08 
PUBLISHING, PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION OF  0.08 
RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS  0.08 
TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND  0.07 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, EXCEPT MACHIN  0.06 
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS  0.06 
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK  0.06 
MANUFACTURING NEC  0.05 
Notes: The values are estimated using the years 1997 to 2003. 
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Table 4: NPL Citations, complexity, adjustment and uncertainty 
 






Within firm sales 
volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Proportion of citations to 
non-patent literature 
0.2681 0.1158 0.1919 
P-val  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Observations are country-3 digit industries. The values are estimated using the years  
1997 to 2003. Column (2): employment volatility is the country-industry average coefficient of variation in 
employment calculated for each firm over the time period. Column (3): sales volatility is the country-industry 
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Table 5: Employment Protection Legislation and Innovation 
Dependent Variable:  All Patent Applications 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Employment Protection Legislation 
(Regular Contracts) 
0.4417 0.3414  0.321  0.8479 
[0.1220]*** [0.1619]**  [0.1361]**  [0.4543]* 
Average working population (mil.) 1997-
2003 
 -0.0026  0.0028  -0.0047 
 [0.0053]  [0.0072]  [0.0092] 
Log of Real Capital per thousand 
workers, 2000 USD, 1995 prices, in year 
1997 
 -0.5967     
 [0.7419]     
Log of Capital per worker at 
1997*Industry capital intensity 
 0.7759     
 [0.4008]*     
Industry Capital Intensity    -3.5953     
   [1.8005]**       
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education 
   2.0159   
     [0.4060]***   
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education*Industry skill intensity 
   -4.2225   
     [1.0242]***   
Industry Skill Intensity      -2.7873   
     [1.2624]**   
Union Density - Average 1997-2003        -0.0216 
       [0.0168] 
Collective Bargaining Coverage        -0.0095 
       [0.0452] 
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-
2003 
     0.1222 
       [0.1213] 
Bargaining Coordination        -1.0381 
       [0.2029]*** 
OECD Product Market Regulations 
1998&2003 Average 
     -1.3472 
       [0.7726]* 
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 
1997-2002 
     16.9807 
       [12.1849] 
% of Claim Spent in Court and Attorney 
Fees (where mandatory) 
     0.0451 
       [0.0298] 
Constant 0.7452  6.1463  4.6065  0.4226 
 [0.0976]***  [3.3970]*  [0.9471]***  [0.7208] 
MNE Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1378  1378  1376  1378 
Notes: All columns show the results of Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
In column (3) Portugal is excluded due to a lack of data on expenditure on education.  
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Table 6: Employment Protection Legislation and Radical Innovation 
Dependent Variable:  NPL Citations 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Employment Protection Legislation 
(Regular Contracts) 
-0.1245 -0.0591  -0.1102  -0.3706 
[0.0414]*** [0.0349]*  [0.0211]***  [0.2099]* 
Log of All Citations Made  1.0013 1.0115  1.0111  1.0175 
  [0.0194]*** [0.0120]***  [0.0113]***  [0.0096]*** 
Average working population (mil.) 1997-
2003 
-0.0092 -0.0087  0.0028 
[0.0019]*** [0.0011]***  [0.0050] 
Log of Real Capital per thousand 




Log of Capital per worker at 
1997*Industry capital intensity 
0.3984 
[0.1114]*** 
Industry Capital Intensity  -1.7793 
  [0.5101]*** 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education 0.0558 
  [0.2950] 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education*Industry skill intensity  0.4631 
  [1.2823] 
Industry Skill Intensity  0.9486 
  [1.4105] 
Union Density - Average 1997-2003  0.0083 
  [0.0065] 
Collective Bargaining Coverage  0.0603 
  [0.0265]** 
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-
2003  -0.0946 
  [0.0640] 
Bargaining Coordination  0.2466 
  [0.1432]* 
OECD Product Market Regulations 
1998&2003 Average  -0.6723 
  [0.1628]*** 
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 
1997-2002  -20.0452 
  [6.6221]*** 
% of Claim Spent in Court and Attorney 
Fees (where mandatory)  0.035 
  [0.0063]*** 
Constant  -0.8759 0.6873  -2.4668  -2.9932 
  [0.1148]*** [0.7775]  [0.3808]***  [0.2334]*** 
MNE Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1378  1378  1376  1378 
Notes: All columns show the results of Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
In column (3) Portugal is excluded due to a lack of data on expenditure on education. 
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Table 7: Employment Protection Legislation and Incremental Innovation – 
Larger Sample 
Dependent Variable:  All Patent Applications 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Employment Protection Legislation 
(Regular Contracts) 
0.571 0.3214  0.4549  1.1349 
[0.1054]*** [0.1667]*  [0.1541]***  [0.4590]** 
Average working population (mil.) 1997-
2003 
0.0057 0.0103  -0.0161 
[0.0055] [0.0067]  [0.0102] 
Log of Real Capital per thousand workers, 
2000 USD, 1995 prices, in year 1997 
-0.0031 
[0.6180] 
Log of Capital per worker at 
1997*Industry capital intensity 
0.671 
[0.3341]** 
Industry Capital Intensity  -3.0386 
  [1.5372]** 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education 1.678 
  [0.3632]*** 
Log of Share of GDP Spent on Higher 
Education*Industry skill intensity  -3.3317 
  [1.0380]*** 
Industry Skill Intensity  -1.6402 
  [1.1057] 
Union Density - Average 1997-2003  -0.0386 
  [0.0128]*** 
Collective Bargaining Coverage  -0.0739 
  [0.0481] 
Employment Tax Wedge - Average 1997-
2003  0.2702 
  [0.1096]** 
Bargaining Coordination  -1.0398 
  [0.2062]*** 
OECD Product Market Regulations 
1998&2003 Average  -1.3049 
  [0.4160]*** 
Credit Institutions per Capita - Average 
1997-2002  29.4541 
  [9.1999]*** 
% of Claim Spent in Court and Attorney 
Fees (where mandatory)  0.0056 
  [0.0236] 
Constant  0.9295  2.2178  3.4095  0.1854 
  [0.0843]***  [2.4865]  [0.6933]***  [0.6170] 
MNE Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2870  2870  2868  2870 
Notes: All columns show the results of Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
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Table 8: Employment Protection Legislation – Regular and Temporary Contracts 
 
Dependent Variable:  All Patent Applications  NPL Citations 
        
EPL (All Contracts)  0.4043      -0.1083     
[0.0988]***    [0.0279]***    
EPL (Temporary 
Contracts) 
 0.2346  0.1261  -0.072  -0.0429 
 [0.0947]**  [0.0794]    [0.0214]***  [0.0438] 
EPL (Regular 
Contracts) 
   0.3532     -0.0845 
   [0.1039]***     [0.0681] 
Log of All Citations 
Made 
    1.0055 1.0043 1.0052 
    [0.0178]*** [0.0181]*** [0.0173]*** 
Constant  0.8964  2.3072 -0.8408 -0.9746 -1.9519 -0.9117 
 [0.0494]***  [0.3597]***  [0.2994]***  [0.1384]*** [0.1180]*** [0.1443]*** 
MNE  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 
Notes: All columns show the results of Poisson regression with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
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Table A1: Data and Sources 





An average of an indicator of legislation for regular contracts (covering procedural inconveniences, direct cost of 
dismissal, notice and trial period) and an indicator for legislation for temporary contracts (covering types of work 
admissible under temporary contracts and maximum cumulative duration allowed). Nicoletti et al (2000). 
2.425 
.89048 
Union Density - Average 
1997-2003 




Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining, whether they are union members or not. Nickell 
(2003), originally obtained from Wolfgang Ochel. 
79.66667 
15.69211 
Employment Tax Wedge - 
Average 1997-2003 
Average of the tax wedge for one-earner family with two children and single persons without children. OECD, 
Taxing Wages, 2003. 
38.74788 
6.950881 
Bargaining Coordination  The degree of coordination of bargaining: 1- firm level, 2- industry level, 3- economy level. We use coordination 
index 2 from Nickell (2003), originally obtained from Wolfgang Ochel. 
2.083333 
.5149287 
OECD Product Market 
Regulations 1998&2003 
Average 
Top level indicator capturing extent of state control of product markets, barriers to entrepreneurship and trade and 
investment. Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
1.700718 
.3538945 
Credit Institutions per Capita 
- Average 1997-2002 
Credit institutions are defined by the European Central Bank as any institution covered by the definition contained 
in Article 1(1) of Directive 2000/12/EC, as amended. Accordingly, a credit institution is "(i) an undertaking whose 
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; or 
(ii) an undertaking or any other legal person, other than those under (i), which issues means of payment in the 




% of Claim Spent in Court 
and Attorney Fees (where 
The estimated cost of suing for breach of contract in a hypothetical case as a percentage of the claim amount. 
Source: Doing Business Report. See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EnforcingContracts/ for data 
19.44167     46
mandatory) and  exact  methodology  7.113554 
Average working population 
(mil.) 1997-2003 
Source: OECD.  19.92361 
18.70212 
Real Capital per thousand 
workers, 2000 USD, 1995 
prices, in year 1997 
For total economy, averaged over sample period. Calculated using a permanent inventory method using gross 




Industry Capital Intensity  Capital divided by output for each industry using US data, average over the sample period. Source: OECD Stan.    1.16211 
.6363175 
Share of GDP Spent on 
Higher Education 
As a proportion of GDP. Averaged over 1991-1995, making it pre-sample period. Source: OECD.  .3635136 
.1318802 
Industry Skill Intensity  Proportion of workers in each two digit industry in the United Kingdom in 2000 with degree or other higher 
education. Source: UK Labour Force Survey.  
.250483 
.128509 
 
 